Founder-Investor Fit

A startup’s early days are focused on only one thing, getting to ‘Product-Market fit’. Savvy investors talk about looking for ‘Founder-Market fit’, which they believe is key to getting ‘Product market fit’. Along with these two, I have been thinking about the concept of ‘Founder-Investor Fit’, which is not talked about much in the ecosystem. During the last few years, we have had multiple discussions with founders (both in our portfolio and outside) about how having (or not having) the right fit between investors and the company (or the founders) has been so positive (or catastrophic) for the company.

One of the triggers for this post was a blow-up that happened a few months back. A very well-known and respected investor got into legal tangles with a portfolio company. This portfolio company was founded by a college dropout, considered a maverick, second-time founder. Now, I do not know the founder too well to be able to comment on him or judge the situation, but I know the investors well, and they have been great partners to us and various founders over the years. I have to say, I do not know much about the issues here, and so, in no way trying to pass any judgment. In one of the media articles, it was mentioned that the relationship between the investor and founder broke down once the founder was trying to raise more debt without aligning the investor and also that the investor was not getting the financial reports on time. The moment I read it, my first thought was that this was never going to work for this investor. I know personally that they are not a fan of raising debt until needed and also are sticklers for financial reporting being done in the right way (we also agree with both, I must add). Beyond any other issues, this was clearly a case of not having a ‘Founder-Investor fit’.

So how should you think of ‘Founder-Investor fit’? Same as how you would think of fitment for an employee – you check for skills and cultural fitment. It is the same as a founder would do it for the next hire.

Let us first start with the ‘skill fitment‘.

In the case of investors, skill fitment will essentially mean that this investor usually invests at your stage and also has experience in your space. A very smart founder/operator, while discussing with me, had compared startup building to a relay race where investors and management keep giving reins to the ‘right’ next set of people. I find this to be quite a useful analogy. The ecosystem has seen many cases where things have not worked out ideally if the founders have not partnered with the ‘right investors’ for that ‘specific stage of the business’.

Similarly, investors with experience in your category will be more likely to have better insights and networks for the business. However, I believe that the right ‘stage fit’ is much more critical compared to ‘space fit’, as there have been a lot of companies where investors with no experience in the category have proven to be the most helpful.

What about ‘cultural fitment’?

We see that founders give a lot more thought to the ‘Skill Fitment’ while deciding their investor partners, but barely any thought goes into checking the ‘Cultural Fitment’ (or its equivalent). This is more critical in our view and here is how we would advise the founders to think about this:

1) Shared goals success metric: For a long-term successful partnership, be it a CXO, any other employee or even an investor, medium-term to long-term goals and the definition of ‘success’ should be the same for all parties. For example at Kae, our stated mission is to help entrepreneurs build enduring companies. If for an entrepreneur, success is to build and sell a company quickly, while this could be very rewarding financially (we get a lot of proposals with ‘you will get 5x in two years’ for your investment and the likes), is not in alignment with our definition of success. We prefer founders to go for building enduring businesses that outrun our time with the company multiple times, instead of building for a quick exit. Similarly, if a founder is looking to build a small/medium-scale but highly profitable and low-risk business, it would not be matching the goal of a large venture fund where the fund’s success is predicated on an outlier, multibillion-dollar outcome.

2) Alignment on success metric: Along with goals, how you measure success is another crucial consideration. When we work with early-stage portfolio companies, we ask them to identify ‘ICP’ and the right ‘success metric’. This is the same exercise that a founder should do, the right success metric for the short, medium, and long term has to be aligned with for good relationship between founders and investors. Just think about this, if a founder is chasing profit (say EBITDA) and the investor is only looking for topline (Or vice versa)- the board room will have two different languages being spoken in the review meetings. A right success metric aligns everyone to one clear north star and short-term milestones.

One of my portfolio companies recently did an alignment exercise in a board meeting, I found it very useful and recommend it to other founders regularly. Similarly, while evaluating a company some time back, the founder spent one full in-person meeting with me only asking me what success looks like to me for her business! I wish a lot more founders do it this way (Maybe not the full meeting, but you get the point)

3) Same core values: After alignment on goals/success metrics, it is very important to see if the founder, employees of the organisation, and investors align on key ‘core values’. A lot of investors are not very vocal about their core values (especially in India) but if you spend enough time with different people in the fund (and also ask), you can get a decent idea of what are the core pillars of their culture. It is then critical to see if there is a broad alignment between the company’s core values (which are mostly driven by the founders’ value system) and the investor’s core values. In our (Kae’s) case, we have ‘respect for all’ and ‘accountability to each other’ as two of our core values- we generally match very well with founders who also embrace these. There are a lot of investors who are very understated/ low-key (as it is part of their culture), if they end up investing in a very high profile, media-loving, flashy founder (or company), there is a good chance of not having a great relationship and outcome.

4) Discussing ‘Non-negotiables’: This is probably the most important alignment to seek and it flows from the values of the investors and founders. It is so critical that if needed, both sides should be upfront and explicit about it. For a lot of investors (including us) integrity is non-negotiable. Similarly, compliance and doing things by the book are the topmost priorities at every stage for a lot of funds. This requires an explicit check, that those non-negotiables are clear to both parties from the start and forever. By the way, this is very much binary- For example, there is nothing like being 90% compliant or integrity in 80% situations. This should be on top of the mind for all the relevant stakeholders at all times.

5) At the end of the day, It is all very personal: While investment funds are tight-knit teams and are aligned around their core values, goals, and procedures, the founder-investor relationship also has a lot of personal nuance to it. Different individuals at any fund usually have different preferences/expectations from the founders and a different way of engaging/working together, which is usually shaped by their individual values/persona and also their investing experience. A good match of personal values (and expectations) and the way of working together is very critical. This is what people usually bucket into great ‘chemistry/vibes’.

Even with all the points written above, it is still not easy for founders to figure out the right founder-investor fit. One of the key reasons is that we VCs are not known to be very transparent and articulate about our way of working and especially our core values. In such a scenario, the existing investors usually become the guide for the founders as they might know the other investors better. Beyond relying on the existing investors, founders should also talk to as many people as they can about the prospective new investors. We usually recommend our portfolio founders to do reference calls with other founders (and help them connect with too), who have gone through tough times in partnership with a particular investor. As they say, your value system and character are most clearly revealed when the going gets tough.

The idea of ‘Founder-Investor fit’ is very important for the investors as well and a lot of times it plays up in the evaluation process. The cost of getting it wrong however is much lower for investors compared to the founders. We were recently discussing the importance of checking for cultural alignment in a new hire with a portfolio company. I always use this statement by the legendary Vinod Khosla about investors with new founders- ‘Think of investors as an employee, whom you can’t fire’. When the founders think so much about cultural alignment with a potential hire, it is very obvious that this should be given more importance in the case of an investor.

I fully understand and empathize with the founders as finding a ‘right fit’ investor is not equivalent to choosing a culturally fit employee, especially as in a capital-scarce market, the relationship can be very asymmetric. However, it is still a very critical aspect of organization building and can be and could prove to be one of the most important factors in the success or failure of a venture.

Changing Nature of B2B Transactions: The Rise of B2B Marketplaces

The history of e-commerce is intertwined with the history and boom of online marketplaces. Using technology to connect buyers with sellers and efficiently facilitate transactions, these online marketplaces have overcome the limitations of an offline market. In an offline world, transactions are limited by geographical reach/information asymmetry and are facilitated by intermediaries, online marketplaces however opens a broader market for the buyers and sellers to meet and transact. Marketplaces also have been a go-to model for tech entrepreneurs and investors because if executed well, they have inherent structural advantages to create a large scale and unlock huge values. Some of the most successful innovative businesses of the last few decades have been online marketplaces.

Consumer marketplaces (B2C) have been around for quite some time and have gone through multiple evolutions of business models, starting from listing-focused classifieds, they evolved into transactional ‘open’ and ‘managed’ marketplaces. While we have large horizontal marketplaces like amazon where you can find anything, we also have vertical marketplaces for a specific categories like fashion, furniture, makeup, etc. Now as a consumer, we have an efficient way of buying almost everything online.

While B2C marketplaces have evolved, innovated, and have become ubiquitous in a consumer’s life, the same can’t be said about B2B. In most economies, B2B transactions usually gross up much more than B2C as every supply chain has multiple businesses in between a producer and a consumer. Unlike B2C where the transactions are usually for personal consumptions, here the purchase is typically part of a chain and the cost of delay or quality failure can be very high. Most industries have complex supply chains, low transparencies, and rely on inefficient intermediaries for trust. B2B transactions happen in different value chains/supply lanes wherein the dynamics and participants don’t usually overlap. Inefficiencies in the value chains make sure that there is a very strong case for efficient B2B marketplaces.

The Indian Landscape

India presents an even more interesting landscape. We are an economy of small businesses. 99% of Indian businesses are what is classified as a ‘micro’ business. These firms are usually ‘family’ or ‘single person’ owned, have very few employees, and turnovers in the range of a few crores of rupees per annum. Most of these micro-businesses have poor margins/efficiencies and also have low levels of technology adoption. While these small businesses are millions in number, they contribute to about 30% of the Indian GDP resulting in smaller throughput. Being largely a fragmented market dotted with millions of suppliers and buyers transacting largely in localized markets, India represents a strong case for B2B marketplaces to disrupt the traditional procurement models. Recent changes like GST, digital penetration, and a generational shift can prove to be tailwinds for this.

All market(place)s are not equal

B2B marketplaces have not always worked out. For every successful one, there are numerous more that have faltered in the long run. There can be a lot of reasons for failure like a bad economic model, poor execution, lack of investment and most importantly choosing the wrong market. There are some markets where an online marketplace (or intermediary) creates value while somewhere it does not.

Before jumping in and start building a digital B2B business, it is better to look through some factors that affect the success of one. There are numerous resources to read about it but Bill Gurley’s 2012 article “All markets are not created equal” is still probably the best starting point. There are quite a few things to think through before building a marketplace, we have listed down some of the important ones for a B2B marketplace

  1. Use of technology- First and foremost it is important to understand, what is the value technology can bring to this supply chain: Is it discovery? (increasing the number of buyers and sellers), is it user experience? (better workflows) or efficiency? (intelligent matchmaking). Also, marketplaces tend to be side oriented i.e. will solve the key problem(s) on either one of supply or demand, think through where is the bigger pain point to be solved using technology.

  2. Fragmentation- This is one of the most important factors to consider before jumping in with a marketplace. The biggest problem that a marketplace solves is discovery and transaction facilitation (by inducing trust), this is what creates value for the intermediary. In the case of supply and demand concentration, this value tends to diminish very quickly. All other things remaining equal, High fragmentation in buyers and suppliers is positive for the marketplace. High concentration on both sides, practically renders a marketplace (or intermediary) redundant. If you have to look at a market with a concentration on one side, it is usually better to build in markets where supply is fragmented.

  3. Throughput- It is important to look at what is going to be the Average order value in the supply chain and also what is the frequency of transactions. A high AOV enables the marketplace to grow faster. A high-frequency marketplace tends to be stickier with high recall value and so (generally) higher cost of shifting. Ultimately, the average transaction value, frequency, and margins (take rate) define the long-term economic viability of the marketplace. It’s important to remember that in B2B, more often than not, margins are lower than in B2C, on a per-transaction basis the unit economics (most of the time) makes sense if the average transaction value is high.

  4. Value chain margins- A key difference between consumer and B2B markets is that the inherent motivation for a business to transact is economic rather than consumption, this makes the value extraction by the marketplace to be mostly dependent on (and capped to) the overall value chain margins. Given that one of the key lures for the participants (supply and demand) is going to be an economic advantage, the take rate will be a smaller piece of the value chain margin. Interestingly, there are cases where the value chain margin is not rigid but expandable, in cases where capacity utilization/inventory liquidation/ ‘sweating the asset’ is important, dynamic pricing can unlock better margins.

  5. Commodity v/s specialized product- An online marketplace usually brings in value of discovery and trust between the transacting parties. In the case of a commoditized or branded product, trust is not that big an issue, in such cases, generally, margins tend to be much lower than specialized/custom products/services.

  6. Direct v/s Indirect- Whether the underlying product/service is direct (eg-raw material) or indirect (eg stationary) expense, defines the underlying motivation for the customer. For a direct spend, price becomes a top priority along with the expectation of zero failure rate in fulfilment. Inertia to change vendors is high in this case which results in lower take rates and longer sales cycles. If successfully executed, direct spending provides a recurring, predictable, and sticky business to a marketplace. For indirect spends, take rates can be higher but the barrier to replacement for the marketplace is comparatively lower.

  7. Monetization and business model- Depending on the value chain margins and overall marketplace dynamics, the business models can go from an open marketplace to a managed marketplace. Similarly, the monetization at scale can be through transaction take rate, subscriptions/advertising, or ancillary services (logistics, credit).

  8. Network effects/Moats- Typically open marketplaces have strong network effects and moats. For managed marketplaces specific workflows, data, and allied services can help create effective structural moats.

 

To summarize, it’s critical to choose the right market and business model before diving in to build a B2B marketplace. The marketplace for a custom/specialized product in a highly fragmented market has a better chance of success compared to a marketplace in a highly concentrated market with a standard product. Also in B2B specifically, it’s critical to think through how you can acquire, onboard, and manage the customers and suppliers efficiently. Because of higher-order values and the criticality of transactions, the zero human touch model is difficult to succeed (at least in the initial days). Business workflows, decision-making, and payment terms are also not simple and straightforward, one of the big challenges that the B2B marketplaces have to navigate (which their consumer siblings don’t) is managing collections, working capital, and credit. It is critical to keep it on a tight leash and put-in processes to skip the downward spiral of the cash trap.

We at Kae Capital continue to be very bullish on B2B commerce and are early investors in Zetwerk, 1K, and a vertical B2B e-commerce marketplace (to be announced soon). If you are building something in B2B, give us a shout at gaurav@kae-capital.com

How Founders Should Think About Scale Before Pitching to a VC

So you have started up recently, have just launched the product six months back, have a few paying customers, good margins, and a clear plan for the next eighteen months! You recently got introduced to this venture capitalist through a common friend and are excited to meet and pitch for a seed round.

For the last couple of years as a venture capital investor, I have had a chance to interact with hundreds of entrepreneurs. Most of them were with solid ideas, great teams and a passion to build something out. 

One of the most difficult things that I have had to do is to say ‘no’ to a lot of ideas with great founding teams which had a solid underlying business, revenue and even path (sometimes imminent) to profit. Still, that business is not a great fit with the venture capital model. 

There has always been a lack of clarity in the mind of a lot of entrepreneurs about what exactly is a ‘venture fundable’ business and why venture capitalists say no to profitable ideas while pouring millions of dollars into (seemingly) loss-making, cash-guzzling businesses!

Most of the founders do not fully understand how the venture capital business model works, (although the share of founders, who understand it is much higher than what it was 5-10 years ago). I always recommend founders first understand the venture capital business before engaging with one. A lot of good reads are already available on this topic. What I really want to convey is a simple actionable framework that can help entrepreneurs to think through before approaching venture capitalists, especially from the perspective of scale.

A <TLDR> from all the stuff that you will find about the venture capital model is that the returns follow power laws and hence first and foremost, scale matters. You will see venture capitalists can (and almost always will), take bets on seemingly difficult businesses (with a higher chance of failure) but the ones which can grow very large. Simply put, high risk but high-reward models. 

Ten minutes into a pitching session, the first question is ‘Can this become large? How large should you be thinking?’
That’s the real (100) million-dollar question.

A rule of thumb that we follow is to try and answer ‘can this business reach a $100 million, high-quality annualised revenue, in the next 7-8 years’. If the answer is yes, you have got (our) attention!

Now let us dissect each aspect of this question and flesh this whole out a little, shall we?

  1. Revenue: It’s important to emphasise here on ‘revenue’. This is not GMV, not GTV, not LTV. In case you are into an intermediary business, (for example, a marketplace), then you should think of this as the commission/take rate or gross margins. This is essentially the price, customers are paying for the value that ‘your business’ is providing.

  2. High quality: This is super important! A good quality revenue is high gross margins (usually software margins of 70 to 90%), strong predictability/repeatability (nothing like a long-term subscription revenue model), and good cashflows (generate positive cashflows with growth and you are golden). This is why SaaS (software-as-a-service) businesses are highly valued — that is as high quality as you can get.

  3. 7-8 years: Are you going to grow fast? Are the conditions (both business as well as market) conducive now for you to quickly scale? Most of the fast-growing businesses can do that because they ride some ‘wave’. New technologies usually change customer behaviours and enable businesses to grow fast.


An important point to also think through is if capital is really going to help your business grow fast. As an example, most B2B businesses traditionally could not grow very fast because of structural reasons and so even though they were in a large market, they were not as attractive to investors. The SaaS wave has changed all of that, as now companies selling to even SMBs can scale very fast.

Having understood the question, before you answer a yes or a no, take some time to also nuance some finer points and visualise how your business and the market look at scale.

First, it is critical to see if you are attacking a market where the ‘target addressable market — TAM’ is large enough to support such a business. When looking at the TAM, most of the founders go with public data and a top-down approach. The usual gist is — billions of dollars in market size and only a 0.1% market capture yields 100s of millions in revenue. This almost always doesn’t work — you wouldn’t be able to find many valuable companies with a 0.1% market share in a large market, it’s usually a larger percentage of a much smaller but highly targeted market.

While calculating ‘TAM’, I always encourage founders to do a ‘bottoms up’ market sizing to go with a top-down approach. It usually will start with you being able to define your core customer segment. The total universe of your core target customer and the price per customer will give a good estimate of the market size, at scale assume that there would be two-three large competitors eying for most of the market share and make reasonable assumptions.

It’s important to also remember that the best companies always end up increasing the TAM! Especially if you are riding a wave, it is difficult to estimate the market size ten years in the future. Still, when you are looking to bet the best part of your productive career, it is prudent to start with a large enough TAM rather than depending only on expanding market size.

There are a lot of other things that go in while evaluating a business for an investment – team, competition, business model, technology and so on, but the deeper dive is contingent on crossing the line on ‘team’ and ‘TAM’.

Now, what if after this consideration, the answer to this question is a ‘no’? In that case, you go with the good old way of building businesses — profits and cashflows. Although this way is less glamorised, this is how most of the large businesses in India (and globally) have been built. They have been financed by conventional debt and public and private equity financing. Family offices and HNIs (with patient capital) are good partners for such a business in the early days, a lot more options open up with a scale.

If the answer to the 100 million dollar question is a ‘yes’ for you, go ahead — a lot of VCs including us at Kae Capital are waiting with (our) chequebooks!